The debate over Elon Musk’s Starlink in India has brought national security, data sovereignty and regulatory oversight into focus. While the company seeks to launch satellite broadband services, security experts have questioned whether India has sufficient control over critical communications infrastructure operated by foreign companies. Others argue that India must strengthen domestic alternatives to reduce […]

The debate over Elon Musk’s Starlink in India has brought national security, data sovereignty and regulatory oversight into focus.
While the company seeks to launch satellite broadband services, security experts have questioned whether India has sufficient control over critical communications infrastructure operated by foreign companies. Others argue that India must strengthen domestic alternatives to reduce long-term dependence.
Starlink, operated by SpaceX, has obtained a telecommunications licence in India but is awaiting the remaining approvals required to begin commercial services.
The Department of Telecommunications said on 8 October that Starlink and two other satellite communications operators—Reliance Jio’s satellite venture and Bharti-backed Eutelsat OneWeb—were at broadly the same stage of the regulatory process.
Security assessments are under way for all three operators. Spectrum assignment can proceed once the applicable requirements are met. The government has said its authorisation framework is fair and non-discriminatory.
Starlink has also signed arrangements with Reliance Jio and Bharti Airtel to explore distribution and related cooperation. These agreements do not, by themselves, authorise a commercial launch.
Low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite networks can extend broadband connectivity to areas poorly served by terrestrial infrastructure. Their operation also raises questions about traffic routing, gateway control, cybersecurity, lawful interception and compliance with government directions.
Speaking to StratNewsGlobal, Brigadier Anshuman Narang (Retd), founder and director of the independent think tank Atma Nirbhar Soch, argued that satellite communications must be assessed for their military and intelligence implications, not merely as commercial services.
“Data is the new oil in peacetime & ammunition in war,” Narang said.
He questioned whether Indian authorities have sufficient visibility into the surveillance-related capabilities of Starlink’s infrastructure. His concern centres on what information the system collects, who can access it and what safeguards govern its use.
Starlink has outlined India-specific security arrangements. Its vice-president for business operations, Lauren Dreyer, has said the company established more than 20 gateway sites, equipped with hundreds of antennas, and developed controls intended to keep Indian users’ data within the country. These arrangements will need to satisfy the government’s security requirements.
Narang cited Ukraine, where Starlink has supported communications during the war, as an example of the military importance of commercial satellite networks. The experience also highlights the implications of relying on privately controlled infrastructure whose availability can be affected by corporate decisions.
He recalled the United States’ refusal to provide India with access to high-accuracy GPS during the 1999 Kargil conflict, arguing that it reinforced the need for independent navigation capabilities.
He also raised concerns about access to commercial satellite imagery during Operation Sindoor. Both examples underpin his argument for developing domestic alternatives.
Former intelligence officer and national security expert Yashovardhan Jha Azad has similarly stressed the importance of safeguards covering traffic routing, cybersecurity and lawful interception subject to due process.
Narang argued that India should invest more heavily in its own commercial satellite communications and imagery capabilities. He questioned whether spending on foreign providers such as Planet and Vantor could instead support Indian satellite launches and domestic industry.
Building an indigenous constellation, however, would require substantial investment in satellites, launch capacity, ground infrastructure, technical expertise and spectrum access.
Dr Srimathy Kesan, founder and CEO of Space Kidz India, said India must balance innovation and competition with enforceable security requirements. “India must welcome innovation without compromising its laws or strategic autonomy,” she said.
Kesan proposed a Strategic South Global Consortium bringing together governments, companies, universities and research institutions across the Global South. She outlined a possible regional satellite constellation beginning with 50–100 LEO satellites, with scope for expansion depending on demand and technical feasibility.
Her preliminary estimates range from US$0.8–2 billion for a pilot deployment to US$8–15 billion for a much larger constellation. These remain indicative proposals rather than approved project budgets.
The immediate task is to establish clear approval processes and enforceable security conditions for all satellite operators.
The longer-term question is how far India should invest in domestic capacity to reduce reliance on foreign providers while benefiting from advances in satellite technology.…Read more by Huma Siddiqui